

20 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Reber

SUBJECT: Coordination of the Intelligence Production Program

1. The four point breakdown in your approach could be simplified into two parts:

a. What should be produced and by whom, and

b. The establishment of a systematic program of dissemination.
I believe your points a. and b. are encompassed, and must be given full cognizance if the two points I have stated are efficiently covered.

2. I find inconsistency in the identification of the paper put out by the Far Eastern Division of CIA. It is called "Working Paper on the Far East" and also "Weekly Intelligence Report No. 1." It has always been my understanding that the "Working Paper" product was merely an informal production tool which synthesized the highlights of current information traffic and that it was for the use of persons working on reports and estimates. Hence to call the "Working Paper" a "report" appears to take it out of the working paper category by giving it a stature and authenticity to stand on its own merit. This point should be clarified.

3. The Weekly Intelligence Report No. 1 on the Far East is on "China's Internal Situation." It is divided into three parts: Part I - China's Military Potential; Part II - China's Economic Stability, and Part III - China's Political Stability. From the viewpoint of already recognized fields of production education, Part I could have been accomplished by the Military Establishment and Parts II and III on the economic and political phases could have been accomplished by the Department of State. We would then have two reports which would need top level coordination by CIA. This process of producing a national intelligence Report should be done in consultation with those responsible at the departmental level for production of departmental reports, since they should be given the opportunity to speak to changes which CIA might be contemplating in the final product by the merger of the military and political viewpoints.

4. Accordingly it seems to me that in the production of a national intelligence report, the departments have final responsibility for

SECRET

primary evaluation, that is, determining the accuracy, completeness and meaning of items; for the analytical process which is that examination of related items of evaluated information; for the integration which is the piecing together of all elements to produce intelligence, and for the interpretation which is the putting of conclusions into their true perspective as far as departmental capacities and resources will permit. It remains, however, for the Central Intelligence Agency to take such departmental products and place them in the true strategic perspective which is the final synthetic process affecting the capacities of the Nation. Thus there is work to be done by ORR in constantly determining what reports are to be undertaken by the several departments and welding together the finished departmental products so that the national policy leaders can obtain the most objective and comprehensive knowledge of the affairs of foreign nations on which to base decisions.

25X1

It is recommended:

1. That the necessity for a Research Office in CIA be clearly established.
2. That a category of National Intelligence Reports, as such, be recognized, and
3. That the thoughts expressed in this memorandum, especially those in paragraphs 3 and 4, be utilized by the Research Office of CIA in developing its rationale.

SECRET